This paper assesses the effect of a nationally mandated free school meal program in India on school enrollment and attendance using survey data. School panel data allow a difference-indifferences estimation strategy, comparing the difference in the participation rates before and after the introduction of the program between treatment and control schools. The results show that the average monthly attendance rate of girls in grade 1 jumps up by more than 10 percentage points with the introduction of the program. Analysis of cross-sectional household data suggests that the program did not lead to a significant increase in overall enrollment levels although panel data indicate a small positive effect on the enrollment rates of girls from disadvantaged socioeconomic groups. Overall the findings show that the program has been more successful in improving participation rates of girls thereby reducing gender disparity in schooling.
Introduction
Universalization of primary schooling and the elimination of gender disparity in education by 2015 are two of the eight Millennium Development Goals adopted at the United Nations Summit in 2000. Assessment of the progress made since shows that South Asia, besides sub-Saharan Africa, is lagging behind in attaining this objective (Glewwe and Zhao, 2006) . With almost 70% of the primary school age population in the region coming from India, the country"s poor performance has been a primary driver of the slow progress made since the UN declaration (Glewwe and Zhao, 2006) . Ironically, the elementary education system of India is one of the largest in the world.
1 But despite its seemingly extensive coverage almost 40 million children do not reach grade 5 (Department of Education, Government of India, 2002-03) . Drop-out rates are high and primary school completion rate in 1998-99 was a mere 58.2% (National Family Health Survey (NFHS), 1998-99). Furthermore, India is one of the regions with the most evident gender gap in schooling (NFHS, 1998-99) . This is particularly stark in its rural areas where female school participation rates lag behind boys" by almost 8 percentage points.
2
As in most developing countries, one of the key reasons cited for a child never enrolling in or dropping out of a school in India is the cost of education and the family"s financial needs 1 There are about 150 million officially enrolled children in nearly 800 thousand schools throughout the country (Department of Education, Government of India, 2002-03).
2 The enrollment rate of girls is almost 7 percentage points lower than that of boys in the primary school age group (6-10 years) which almost doubles at the secondary level of education. The gender gap is almost 6 percentage points higher in rural India compared to the urban areas for children in the primary school age group (National Family Health Survey of India, 1998-99) . (NFHS, 1998-99) . 3 Although tuition in public primary schools is negligible and almost completely subsidized, the overhead costs of books and uniforms can be quite high, dissuading poor families from sending their children to school (Public Report on Basic Education for India (PROBE), 1999) . 4 Often children leave school to contribute to family income (either explicitly or implicitly) by engaging in household work, on the family farm/business or by working for wages. Engagement in household work as a reason for dropping out of school is cited more often for girls than boys (NFHS, 1998-99) . Thus besides pure sex preference, poverty can further exacerbate gender disparity if the opportunity costs of sending girls to school is high relative to the expected returns to their education in the labor market (Kingdon, 1998) .
Not surprisingly, therefore, both survey and experimental studies suggest that programs which reduce the cost of education can be an effective means of improving participation rates in developing countries. 5 Evaluation of conditional cash transfer programs in Latin America, which 3 A child being required for either household work, on farm/family business or outside work for pay as a reason for dropping out of school in the NFHS (1998-99) has been categorized here as "financial needs". 4 The PROBE (1999) report estimates that the average annual cost of sending a child to a rural primary school in 1996 was Rs. 318, far from negligible. The official exchange rate is $1= Rs. 40 and the average per capita income of an Indian was $564 in 2003.
5 Besides improving participation rates, policy emphasis also needs to be on improved learning in order to sustain higher participation through increased retention rates and reduced drop-outs.
The World Development Report (2004) , therefore, emphasizes a multidimensional policy affecting both the quality of schooling and parents" incentives to send children to school. A slew of recent studies (Banerjee et al., 2006; Duflo and Hanna, 2006; Chaudhary et al., 2005) suggest attempt to address education as a correlate of poverty, suggest that they have been successful (Morley and Coady, 2003 ). Schultz"s (2004) randomized study of the most well-known of such programs, Progresa in Mexico, shows a significant effect of the conditional cash subsidy on raising primary school enrollment with the largest increase for girls. Evaluations of in-kind school transfer programs in developing countries suggest similar impacts. In a randomized assessment of the effect of provision of uniforms and textbooks along with classroom construction in Kenya, Kremer et al. (2002) find a considerable decline in drop-out rates in treatment schools. Survey studies on take-home raw food grains program in Bangladesh (Ravallion and Wodon, 2000) indicate a significant effect on increasing enrollment rates in schools. This paper assesses the impact of one such subsidy scheme, the nationally mandated school meal program in India.
In recent years there has been growing emphasis on providing free school meals as a targeted in-kind transfer which can improve not only educational outcomes but also learning of children in developing countries. This form of subsidy has potential implications for enrollment as well as daily school participation since children must attend school to receive the meals.
Proponents also argue that poor nutrition and hunger at school could be a significant impediment to learning leading to weak academic performance. Given these broad anticipated benefits of such a scheme, the National Program of Nutritional Support to Primary Education (or the Midday Meal Scheme) was launched in India in 1995. The program benefits 120 million primary school children (Human Resource Development Ministry, 2005-06) across the country making it one of the largest school feeding programs in the world. But despite the scope and significance that improving the quality of teaching or reducing teacher absenteeism can lead to greater participation rates and better academic performance of students.
of this program the evidence on its impact in India is startlingly meager. 6 In a rare survey study of the effect of school quality on participation in rural India, Dreze and Kingdon (2000) find that provision of mid-day meals increased enrollment of girls but not of boys in primary schools.
7
However, their result has to be interpreted cautiously since the authors did not address the issue of endogeneity of program placement. A few studies for other developing countries also indicate a positive impact. A randomized study of a preschool feeding program in Kenya (Vermeersch and Kremer"s, 2005) showed a 30% increase in school participation compared to the control group while a school feeding program in chronically food insecure areas of Bangladesh raised school enrollment by 14.2% (Ahmed, 2004) .
6 Studies commissioned by the Indian government (Planning Commission, 2000; Laxmaiah et al., 1999) either compare the trends in enrollment and attendance in periods before and after the Mid Day Meal Program was implemented in select states or conduct a cross-sectional comparison of participation rates in treatment and control schools. The results mostly show success of the program in raising enrollment and attendance rates, especially of girls.
7 Survey studies Goyal, 2003 and Planning Commission, 2000) While enrollment has been the focus of most research on this scheme, school meal programs are also directed at the poor daily attendance of students in developing countries. 8 In a scenario where enrollment does not necessarily signify attendance, enrollment might not be a true indicator of participation rates in developing countries. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is significant student absenteeism in India although data on daily attendance rates is virtually non-existent. 9 These abysmal attendance rates can be attributed to the low quality of schooling and to household financial constraints. 10 Improvements in daily attendance could, arguably, raise academic performance and thereby reduce grade repetition and drop-out rates.
This paper aims to investigate to what extent the mandated provision of free meals in public primary schools in a rural area of central India was effective in raising enrollment and 8 To the best of my knowledge, the only school meal evaluation which looks at the impact on daily attendance is for Bangladesh where school attendance increased by 1.3 days per month (Ahmed, 2004) and with the provision of meals. Vermeersch and Kremer"s (2005) results are for a pre-school feeding program in Kenya.
9 A recent survey conducted in 21 states by the Indian Human Resource Development Ministry (2007) finds that in most north Indian states student attendance averages around 60% on a school day in public primary schools. Duflo and Hanna"s (2006) paper on teacher absenteeism in primary schools in Rajasthan also suggests a daily attendance rate of about 60% for students.
10 Which of these two factors has a greater effect on school attendance is an empirical question. Duflo and Hanna (2006) find no significant effect of improvement in school quality through increased teacher presence on students" daily attendance in schools in Rajasthan. Conditional cash subsidy provided under Progresa in Mexico did not lead to a significant effect on attendance rates (Schultz, 2004) as well.
attendance rates as well as reducing gender disparities in participation. The impact of the meal program on the total enrollment and average school attendance rates is estimated by grade and gender using panel data on schools in the survey region. I adopt a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, comparing the difference in the participation rates before and after the introduction of the program in schools which implemented the cooked meal program within the first six months of a new academic year to that of a control group whose program participation status did not change during this period. This allows me to control for time invariant unobservables that are correlated with program placement and the participation rates. The robustness of the results for enrollment obtained from the difference-in-differences strategy is checked through a non-linear model at the individual level using household data. This accounts for family or community characteristics that maybe correlated with presence of the school meal program and which may influence individual participation decisions as well.
The analysis indicates a non-trivial effect of the introduction of cooked school meals on the school attendance rates of girls in lower grades. The average monthly attendance rate of girls in grade 1 jumps up by more than 10 percentage points. There is a positive but insignificant impact of the scheme on the attendance rates of boys in grade 1. However, the results suggest that the on-site school meal program did not lead to a significant increase in overall enrollment levels although there was a small positive effect on the enrollment rate of girls from disadvantaged socio-economic groups. Individual child level analysis using the household data leads to similar conclusions for enrollment effects.
The results do not necessarily imply that the cooked meal program did not lead to improvement in enrollments. Schools in the survey area were distributing free food grains every month before transitioning to cooked meal provision. The finding most likely indicates that cooked meals did not provide any additional incentives for enrollment over the previous program. Nevertheless, overall, the findings do indicate that the program has been successful in reducing gender disparity in school participation rates.
The gender effects can be explained by two features of this school subsidy scheme. First,
given that the cost of schooling increases for upper grade levels while the cash value of a cooked school meal is constant across grades, the meal subsidy is implicitly relatively larger for lower grade children. Second, the finding that there is almost no redistribution of nutrients away from a program participant within the household (Afridi, 2007) coupled with the fact the food transfer through school meals forms a larger proportion of the daily dietary requirement of the young and females, it affects the incentives of parents of these children. These two factors reinforce each other to induce households to send girls in lower grades to school more regularly.
From a policy perspective the findings suggest that introduction of public programs which subsidize the cost of schooling can be useful policies for improving participation rates.
Further, subsidies which even implicitly target girls can be effective in reducing gender disparities against females in education.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. The institutional characteristics of the meal program are described in the next section. Section 3 and 4 detail the data and methodology used, respectively, in estimating the program"s impact. The results are discussed in section 5 while section 6 concludes.
Institutional Background
A.
The School Feeding Program in India
The kilograms per student per school month subject to the attendance rate of 80% even after July.
This quantity of food grains was equivalent to the 100 grams of wheat provided under the cooked 13 The school participation rates in the survey data are representative of the picture at the national level. The current enrollment rate of girls in the 5 to 18 age group is 11 percentage points lower than that of boys. This gap is smaller for being ever enrolled in school, indicating that girls are more likely to drop out than boys. When the sample is restricted to children who are 12 to 18 years of age, the gender disparity in completion of primary schooling is glaring. Disaggregating the data by socio-economic groups (the excluded group is non-SC/ST/OBC) shows that participation rates of ST children, particularly girls, is the poorest.
14 The school academic year in the sampled district is for 10 months from July to April. Each school month consists of approximately 20 school days, constituting a total of 200 school days in a year. Thus, the quantity of raw food grains a child was entitled to under the cooked and monthly grain distribution programs were equivalent. meal program on a school day (i.e. 10 school months each of which comprises of 20 school days). 15 The administrative and financial responsibility of implementing the meal program in all public primary schools in a village in MP lay with the elected village governing body or GP (Gram Panchayat). 16 Each GP typically consists of 1 to 5 villages, including all the public primary schools therein, within its purview. Thus, the implementation of the school meal scheme may have been endogenous to that particular village or community due to the institutional characteristics of the program. November and March children are usually employed either on the family farm or for daily wages on someone else"s land. Typically during busy agricultural seasons the attendance in schools is lower than normal. But in both July and December agricultural activity is low, thus, I do not expect the average attendance rates of children in schools to be systematically different between these two months.
The summary statistics for the school level data are presented in Table 1 . 41 of the 74 surveyed schools implemented the cooked school meal program between July and December (column 1). 18 The remaining 33 schools did not change their implementation status during this period. This includes 17 schools which implemented the cooked meal program in July itself (column 2) and 16 which did not implement the program at all (column 3). The latter group includes all private primary schools which were not mandated to provide cooked meals or distribute raw food grains and 6 public primary schools (three of these were distributing raw food grains and the other three did not have any program, in both July and December). A
comparison of other school characteristics shows that the cost of primary schooling (tuition and miscellaneous fees) is much higher in private schools as also is the quality of schooling indicated by the lower pupil-teacher ratio and better instructional facility such as availability of blackboards. The attendance rate is comparable across all four school groups in both July and
December. Enrollment levels are somewhat higher in schools in columns 1 and 2. On the whole, the regularity in the provision of school meals improved between July and December, 2003. Across the two months and groups, the attendance rate in grade one is lower than the upper grades. The attendance rates tend to rise from grade one to two and then decline, particularly for girls in July. Typically, first and fifth grade attendance rate jumps up for both boys and girls, more strongly for the latter, in December compared to July. Though the trends in attendance differ between July and December, they are similar across the two groups of schools. From the raw statistics we can conclude that the trends in attendance rates are comparable across the treatment and control public primary schools.
19 Table 2 shows the summary statistics for a sample of 1106 children in the 5-12 age group currently residing with the surveyed households 20 . The average age in the sample is 8.47 years.
88% of the sample is currently enrolled in a school. Half of the sampled children belong to an officially designated Below (or On) Poverty Line (BPL) household 21 . While 67% of the parents indicated that they would support their son"s education up to the level he desires, only 56% of the parents of the sampled children favored continuing the education of the daughter to her desired level, indicating a bias against girls" education 22 . From the village survey, information is available on the characteristics of the GP president such as whether the elected position of GP president was reserved for a disadvantaged social group (referred to as scheduled castes (SC) or scheduled tribes (ST)) and the gender of the president. 23 There is uniformity in implementation of the cooked meal program across public primary schools within a village in the data. There was only one village, whose public schools were neither distributing raw food grains nor serving cooked meals by September, 2003. 24 Parents might enroll their child based on expectations of program implementation as well.
Under that scenario, this estimation strategy would give a lower bound estimate of the program"s effect on enrollment.
25 Of the 276 children who fall in the control group, 83 were in schools with no program, 71 with dry rations and 122 in schools where the cooked meal program started after September 30.
villages have a non-ST household head and come from BPL households. In villages of treated children the distance to the public secondary school is shorter and they are more likely to have a male and ST GP president. Table 4 shows the survey data on the annual household expenditure on public schooling by grade and the proportion of the costs covered by the cooked school meal program. 26 The cash value of the cooked school meals (food grains and other ingredients including oil, sugar and salt)
is equivalent to more than 160% of the annual cost of public schooling borne by households for grade 1 children and 78% of the costs for grade 5. Thus although the quantity of the ingredients used in the meals is invariant across all levels of primary schooling, the scheme provides a proportionately higher subsidy to children in lower grades because the costs of schooling and village survey data on the market price of food grains was used to estimate the cash value of the cooked meals.
higher grades 27 . While tuition, textbooks and school uniforms constitute the cost of school enrollment, expenditure on other fees (such as fees paid before examinations) stationary and transportation costs depend more on the regularity of school attendance. Thus the subsidy is relatively larger for both enrollment and attendance in lower grades.
Empirical Methodology
The ideal estimation strategy for evaluating the impact of the cooked meal scheme on school participation would be randomization of program participation at the individual level. But since the scheme was mandated for all public primary schools randomization of program participation at the individual (or even school) level was not possible. However not all public primary schools in the survey region had implemented the program at the same time during the survey. The initiation of the program was staggered over the academic year as described in section 2. Thus I take advantage of the staggered implementation of the program to address the potential endogeneity of program placement and estimate its impact on participation.
As discussed in section 3, the summary statistics on participation in Table 1 percentage points and almost 9 percentage points for grade 5 girls from July to December in schools which started serving cooked meals during this period. But the change in attendance rates for the middle grades is much smaller. The trend is comparable for boys. This variation in average attendance rates in addition to the fact that the subsidy is implicitly and relatively larger for lower grades necessitates analysis by grade and gender.
I follow a difference-in-differences strategy to evaluate the program"s effect between
July and December, 2003. DD , then, is the difference-in-differences estimate of the impact of providing cooked school meals on the average participation rate in a school which implemented the program between July and December.
Participation is defined as both enrollment levels and daily attendance. The latter includes outcomes in levels as well as rates. The enrollment level is defined as the total number of students listed in the school register by grade, gender and socio-economic group in July and December. The average monthly attendance rate was calculated by dividing the average number of students (by grade and gender) who attended school in the month with the total school enrollment in that month. However, this measure does not take into account an increase in the enrollment rate due to the meal program and could, therefore, bias downward the program"s impact on attendance rates. Thus, in order to account for any changes in enrollment rates between July and December I also run the analysis for the average level of attendance (by grade and gender) which is the sum of the number of students who attended on each school day in the month over the total number of school days in that month.
A pertinent concern, however, remains about the reliability of the school records used to obtain the participation data. In developing countries public school records of enrollment and attendance are often suspected of being inflated. What is not clear, however, is whether this exaggeration is at the school level or at a higher level of aggregation. Assuming that the records are not reliable even at the school level, the difference-in-differences estimate will be able to correct for this bias if there is no change in the degree of or incentive to inflate participation figures before and after the introduction of the meal program in the treatment schools. There are two very compelling reasons to believe that this assumption holds. First, food grains were being released to the schools at the beginning of a month based on the enrollment figures, and not the average attendance, in the previous month in the survey region unlike in some urban municipalities in India where grains are released after the distribution of meals and verification of attendance records. Second, most public schools were distributing raw food grains before the introduction of the cooked meal program. All schools were directed to implement the program from July onwards and, therefore, the quantity of grains released at the rate of 2 kilograms per child per month was the same irrespective of whether the school was implementing the cooked meal program or distributing raw food grains. Thus there should be no differential incentive to exaggerate the enrollment records either. Since the nature of the program is unlikely to be correlated with the either the level or direction of the fudging of school records, 3
 should give a true estimate of program impact. However, if the degree of inflation is so large as to leave little scope for an increase after program implementation, the impact of the school meal program on school participation would be biased downwards. Table 5 shows the results of the analysis of the effect of introducing cooked meals on school enrollment levels. Each column shows separate regressions of the total, boys" and girls" monthly school enrollment on schools" participation in the cooked meal program in July and December.
Results
Results are reported for the complete sample of public and private primary schools in specification 1 and for the sample restricted to only public primary schools in specification 2.
The first row reports the coefficient for the difference-in-differences (DID) impact of the program. Across all groups in specification 1 the point estimate of the DID effect is negative but insignificant, suggesting that implementation of the program did not lead to an impact on enrollments. But private primary schools may have significantly different characteristics from that of the public primary schools as discussed in Table 1 . I take into account the possibility that the trends in enrollments in private and public primary schools, therefore, may differ and bias the program"s impact by restricting the sample to only public primary schools in specification 2. The point estimates of the effect of the cooked school meal program remain insignificant as indicated by the coefficients in the first row of column 2.
The insignificant program impact on aggregate enrollment levels could be masking variation in its effect across gender and socio-economic groups. 28 In Table 6 , therefore, the analysis is conducted at a disaggregated level for public primary schools. The coefficients in the first row for boys suggest that there is no differential impact on boys" enrollment levels in 28 The socio-economic classification of students was obtained from the school records. The survey region was predominantly populated by disadvantaged groups (54% of the sampled households had an ST head, 29% OBC and 13% SC). More than 77% of the sampled schools had no enrolled student in the general or "not-disadvantaged" group. schools which initiated cooked meals before December compared to the control schools. The significant negative coefficient on the December dummy indicates that SC boys are likely to drop out as the school year progresses. For girls, the coefficient on the DID term is positive and significant for ST girls implying that their enrollment levels increased due to the school meal program introduction. But insignificant coefficients in the first row for SC and OBC girls show that the program did not affect enrollment in other socio-economic groups. Interestingly, the current enrollment rate of 5 to 18 year old ST girls is also the lowest in the survey data (63% compared to the sample average of 70% for all girls). Thus the results here suggest that the cooked meals program may be more effective in improving enrollment levels of children in households that are on the margins of enrollment decisions.
A further disaggregation of the data by gender and grade in Table 7 again indicates insignificant program effect on boy"s enrollment levels in public primary schools across all grades. However, the coefficients on the December dummy suggest a time trend in enrollment levels which varies across grades for boys. Enrollment levels of boys rise in grade 1 from July to December but fall for higher grades, the decline being larger in upper grades as suggested by the larger magnitude of the negative coefficient on December for grade 4 boys. The trend across grades is similar for girls with a significantly negative coefficient on December for grade 5 girls" enrollment level. Surprisingly, the coefficient on the DID term for girls in grade 2 is significantly negative suggesting that implementation of the cooked meal program lead to a fall in their enrollment levels. However it is small in magnitude and the DID coefficient for all other grades are insignificant.
The analysis so far indicates that the cooked meals program did not improve enrollment level for boys. However, it may have increased the total enrollment of ST girls marginally. The results do not necessarily imply that school meal programs are ineffective in increasing enrollments. Since schools were distributing raw food grains in the survey region before transitioning to serving cooked meals, the results suggest that the subsidy provided by the latter scheme did not affect enrollment incentives over and above those provided by the raw food grains program. This is more apparent from the fact that the difference between cash value of the two programs is marginal (equivalent to the value of ingredients other than food grains used in cooked meals) since more than 76% of the cooked meal subsidy consisted of the value of food grains. Given that availing the subsidy provided by the cooked meals requires daily school attendance, one would expect the program"s impact to be more significant on this indicator of participation rather than enrollments.
The results for the analysis of daily attendance are described next. In Table 8 in both specifications 1 and 2, the attendance rate of boys is higher than that of girls by about one percentage point when we compare the constants. In schools which implemented the cooked school meal program during the first six months of the academic year the attendance rates are lower and significantly so when the sample consists of only public primary schools in specification 2, suggested by the negative coefficients on "change in participation in cooked meal scheme" for total and girls" attendance rates. The significant positive coefficients on the December dummy in specification 1 across all sample groups is mostly driven by private schools which were not mandated to implement the meal program. Their inclusion in the sample, therefore, leads to negative point estimate of the DID effect as shown in row 1 of specification 1.
Restricting the sample to public schools in specification 2 produces a positive but insignificant effect of implementation of the cooked meals program on attendance rates as indicated by the coefficients on the DID term in row 1. But the point estimate of the DID effect for girls is larger in magnitude than for boys in specification 2.
The first five columns in Table 9 show the results for the average monthly attendance rate of boys in grades 1 to 5 while the next five show the effect on attendance rate of girls. The coefficient on the DID estimate is insignificant across all grades for boys. But the point estimate for grade 1 boys is positive but imprecise probably due to the small sample size. The attendance rate of girls in grade 1 increases by 10.5 percentage points in schools which implemented the cooked meal program after July as indicated by the DID coefficient in row one.
Schools whose program participation status changed had lower attendance rates in grade 1, especially for girls as indicated by the negative coefficient in the second row for grade 1 girls.
In addition, comparing the constants across grades suggests that attendance rates are lowest in grade 1 for both for boys and girls. The attendance rates rise in the middle grades and then decline in higher grades for both genders. This is particularly true for girls" attendance rate which jumps down from 84% in grade 4 to 81% in grade 5. Boys" attendance rates decline steadily from grade 2 to 4. This trend coupled with the negative coefficient on December dummy for enrollment levels in Table 7 may reflect the large drop-out rates between primary and secondary schooling in India, particularly for girls 29 . However, while the level of enrollment falls in higher grades in December relative to July for boys (Table 7) , the trend in the attendance rate is opposite as suggested by the positive coefficient on December for boys and girls in grade 5. 29 According to the NFHS (1998-99), the enrollment rate of girls falls by almost 14 percentage points between the age groups 6-10 and 11-14 years while for boys the drop is of about 5 percentage points.
Analysis of the impact of the school meal program on the level of attendance in Table 10 leads to the same conclusions. The number of girls attending grade 1 increased by 1.77 per school day and in grade 3 by 0.81 due to the school meal program, as shown by the coefficients in row 1. The effect on attendance level of boys is not significant.
Robustness
In order to check the robustness of the enrollment results obtained from the school panel data to ()
The dependent variable is H iv , the current enrollment of child i in village v. X iv is individual characteristics of child i, h iv X is a vector of household characteristics such as parental education, the dependency ratio in the household, annual income and ownership of assets. It also includes a dummy for parental preferences for girls" schooling which equals 1 if in the household survey the parent"s response to the question "How much education do you wish to give your daughter?"
was "As much as she desires". The coefficient on this variable reflects the attitudes of the parents towards schooling of both sons and daughters. X v is a vector of village characteristics such as distance from the village center to the nearest public secondary school and daily adult labor wage. (2) separately for girls and boys to identify any differential impact of the cooked meal program on current enrollment for children in the 5 to 12 age group. Thus while the DID strategy tests whether any improvement in enrollment levels was greater in schools which implemented the program between July and December, the cross-sectional strategy tests whether the level of enrollment is higher in schools which implemented the program by the end of September.
As discussed in an earlier section, program placement may have been endogenous to the GP. Dreze and Kingdon (2000) , using PROBE (1999) data, suggest that the scheme was more likely to be adopted in socio-economically deprived areas. If these areas also have lower enrollment levels, in a cross sectional analysis the impact of the cooked meal program on raising enrollment levels would be biased downwards. I address the potential endogeneity of program placement by instrumenting for the presence of a cooked school meal program in a village by the gender of the GP president.
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The 73 rd amendment of the Constitution of India in 1992 allowed for one-third of GP presidents" seats in all states to be randomly reserved for women. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2003) take advantage of this randomization to show that the gender of the GP president affects the nature of provision of local public goods in rural India. 31 Male GP presidents showed a greater preference for investing in education programs while females invested more resources in improving drinking water facilities (since women are primarily responsible for collecting water for which they usually have to travel long distances). Since the GP has to allocate funds to 30 For all, except 5 GPs, only one sampled village fell within its jurisdiction. 31 This was a nationwide randomization policy which has been implemented in Madhya Pradesh as well. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2003) also find that a negligible percentage of female GP presidents were elected from unreserved GPs (6.7% in West Bengal and 1.7% in Rajasthan).
various competing public programs in villages within its jurisdiction and the resource allocation preferences of male and female presidents may differ, the gender of the GP president can influence program placement but it is unlikely to have a direct effect on individual enrollment decisions. Given the findings of the current literature, one would expect schools under a male GP president to transition early to cooked meals program. Since this instrument may be correlated with the provision of other educational resources and public school facilities that directly affect enrollments the analysis controls for other observable school characteristics as well. Table 11 Table 11 . Thus the overall result of small or insignificant effect of cooked school meals on enrollment from the school panel data analysis is held up. Recall that most villages, whose public primary schools had not started serving cooked meals, were distributing free grain rations. The insignificant effect of the former program on individual enrollment decisions again suggests that introduction of cooked meals did not influence investment incentives over and above the impact that distribution of grain rations might have already had on school enrollments.
Overall, the results imply that the cooked meal scheme program was effective in raising the school attendance of children in lower grades particularly that of girls". This result is not surprising considering that the scheme effectively gives a proportionately larger subsidy to lower relative to the upper grades. This feature of the program is reinforced by the fact that, based on the child nutrition data collected in this survey, on average the wheat porridge meal was providing only 183 kcals of energy and 5.2 grams of protein to each enrolled child on a school day in the public primary schools (Afridi, 2007) . Since the Recommended Dietary Allowance (RDA) or daily nutritive requirement of younger children is lower (Gopalan, Sastri and Balasubramaniam, 2004) it is reasonable to conclude that the wheat porridge meal formed a larger proportion of the total daily food intake of younger children. This would be particularly true for girls who are more likely to be provided fewer daily nutrients within the household in India (Pitt, Rosenzweig and Hassan, 1990) . Analysis of the proportion of the nutrient transfers by which the daily intake of program participants increases indicates an almost one-for-one increase (Afridi, 2007) . In addition, there may be less reallocation of food away from younger and female program participants within the household (Afridi, 2007) . In effect, therefore, the food transfer is larger for girls and boys in lower grades compared to kids in higher grades in public primary schools.
On average, therefore, the impact of the program on participation rates of girls is higher.
The scheme affects the attendance decisions of those whose school participation rate is on the margin: those whose attendance rates were low in the absence of the program and for whom the food transfer forms a significant proportion of the daily intake.
Conclusion
In this paper I use school and household survey data from a rural area of India to investigate whether a nationally mandated cooked school meal program has been successful in raising the overall school participation rates and reducing the existing gender disparity in enrollments and daily attendance.
The results indicate that cooked school meal program did not have an impact on enrollments over and above the effect which may have been induced by the pre-existing program of distributing raw food grains to primary school students. But the differentially larger subsidy provided by the cooked meals vis-à-vis raw food grain distribution did lead to a marginal increase in the enrollment level of ST girls. The program"s impact was significant on daily attendance decision. There is a large and significant increase in the attendance level and rates of girls in lower grades and a positive, but insignificant impact on first grade boys. The attendance rates of girls in grade 1 increased by more than 10 percentage points due to the cooked school meals.
The significant impact on lower grades is explained by two factors. First, the cash value of the meal subsidy is implicitly relatively larger for lower grade children. Second, the food transfer forms a larger proportion of the daily intake of younger children and girls. These two factors reinforce each other to increase the incentives of parents to send girls in lower grades to 29 school more regularly. Thus the program is indeed effective in reducing the gender disparity in school participation rates.
The results are supported by the evidence from previous survey data and anecdotal evidence on the impact of the meal program in India (Dreze and Kingdon, 2000; Dreze and Goyal, 2003) . These studies suggest that school meal programs are particularly effective in increasing the school enrollment rates of first graders and girls. Qualitative data on perceptions of school headmasters and parents from this survey also suggests that younger children are more attracted to attending school due to the program which makes it easier to ensure that their school participation is more regular.
There are two important policy implications of these results. First, school subsidies can be an important policy instrument for making schooling more desirable for resource poor households. Second, school subsidies which even implicitly target girls can be effective in reducing gender disparities in education. However, in order to stem the high drop-out rates before the completion of primary schooling the provision of meals whose quantity increases proportionally with age or the daily dietary requirement of children may be more effective. Note: Standard errors corrected for clustering on the school reported in parentheses. Model (1) includes public and private primary schools and in model (2) the sample has been restricted to only public primary schools. * Significant at 10%, ** 5% and ***1% Note: Standard errors corrected for clustering on the school reported in parentheses. The sample has been restricted to only public primary schools. SC-scheduled caste, ST-scheduled tribe, OBC-other backward castes. * Significant at 10%, ** 5% and ***1% Note: Standard errors corrected for clustering on the school reported in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** 5% and ***1% Note: Standard errors corrected for clustering on the school reported in parentheses. Model (1) includes public and private primary schools and in model (2) the sample has been restricted to only public primary schools. * Significant at 10%, ** 5% and ***1% Note: Standard errors corrected for clustering on the school reported in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** 5% and ***1% Note: Standard errors corrected for clustering on the school reported in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** 5% and ***1% 
Constant
-6.440*** -6.361*** -6.082*** -8.570*** -7.032*** -7.292*** -5.73*** -6.097*** -5.971*** (0.937) (1. Endogenous variables. In models 2 and 3 cooked meal program is instrumented by sex of GP president. * Significant at 10%, ** 5% and ***1%
